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L. Introduction
In his Note, Beyond BATSA: Getting Serious About Corporate Tax
Reform,1 Quinn Ryan examines several common defects of state corporate
income taxes that, in isolation or in combination, create distortions, inequities,
and complexity, and argues for federal legislation that would substantially
reduce the problems he describes. I will expand a bit on Ryan's analysis,
review some history, and argue that neither multilateral state action nor federal
legislation-especially legislation that would not make matters worse-is likely
to occur.
* The author acknowledges the helpfuhl comments Walter Hellerstemn made on an earlier
draft of this comment.
1. Quinn T. Ryan, BeyondBATSA: Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax Reform,
67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 275 (2010).
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HI. The Four Components of a Uniform System
An ideal system of state corporate income taxes would exhibit uniformity
in four important respects: the definition of the potential taxpayer (or of the
corporate group whose economic activities are considered in determining tax
liability); standards for jurisdiction to tax, hereinafter "nexus"; the definition of
income that is potentially subject to tax; and the method used to divide taxable
income among the states.2 Uniformity of rates would not be required, should
not be imposed, and, as in Ryan's Note, is not considered further.3
The "system" of state corporate income taxes actually found in the United
States fails on all four counts,4 although there is a fair amount of uniformity
across states in the definition of income-an issue that will, for that reason, not
be considered further here. State assertion of nexus is restricted by federal
statutory law (Public Law 86-272) under certain circumstances, but not others,
and whether a federal constitutional restriction on the assertion of nexus in the
sales and use tax area is applicable for income tax purposes is a matter of
continuing controversy in state courts.6 Although a model law, the Uniform
2. These are not the only characteristics of a good subnational income tax. See generally
Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes-And the Nuttiness of
Responses Thereto, 25 STATE TAX NOTES 841 (2002) [hereinafter McLure, Nuttiness of State
and Local Taxes] (urging uniformity in state and local taxes); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Long
Shadow of History: Sovereignty, Tax Assignment, Legislation, and Judicial Decisions on
Corporate Income Taxes in the US and the EU, in CoMPARAT~vE FiscAL FEDERALISM 119
(Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter McLure, Long Shadow] (discussing the
practice of tax assignment). For an analysis of the proper structure of a subnational. income tax
that focuses on economic distortions, see William F. Fox. et al., How Should a Subnational
Corporate Income Tax on Multistate Businesses Be Structured?, 58 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (2005).
3. Indeed, state sovereignty over tax rates is the key to a viable federal system. By
comparison, all other design features of subnational taxes are secondary. See generally Charles
E. McLure, Jr., Tax Assignment and Subnational Fiscal Autonomy, 54 BULL. INT'L FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION 626 (2000) (discussing the "tax assignment problem": what taxes should
subnational governments levy and how should subnational governments collect). For a
profoundly different view, see American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) Resolution to
Oppose NCCUSL Effort to Rewrite the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act,
http://www.nccusl.orgfUpdate/Docs/UTITPA/IJDITPAALECresolution.pdf (last visited Jan.
24, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), which states, "a uniform tax on
corporate income contravenes ALEC's mission to support state sovereignty."
4. For more extended discussions, see McLure, Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes,
supra note 2; McLure, Long Shadow, supra note 2.
5. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATIoNI 7.02 (3d ed.
1998 & Supp. 2009) ("The outstanding characteristic of state corporate net income taxes is their
broad conformity to the federal corporate income tax."). Despite what Hellerstein and
Hellerstein call "broad conformity," state and federal tax bases exhibit important differences, to
which Hellerstein and Hellerstein devote 130 pages. Id. 1 7.02-. 17.
6. Ryan, supra note 1, at 29 1-92, 301-07.
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Division of Income for Tax Purposes Acte (UDITPA), has been in existence for
over fity years, it deals with only one of the four areas where unifonmity would
be desirable, not all income tax states have adopted it or patterned their laws
after it, and, despite UDITPA's endorsement of an apportionment formula that
accords equal weight to the taxpayer's payroll, property, and sales, there is
substantial variation in the weights that the states actually apply, with an
increasing number giving sales double or greater weight-or even sole weight,
presumably for economic development reasons.8
In his note, Ryan has emphasized the lack of a clear nexus standard and
the need for a uniform definition of income and a uniform method of dividing
income, describing the inequities, economic inefficiencies, and complexity that
result from the current defective system.9  He argues that the federal
government should enact legislation that would allow a state to assert nexus
over any corporation that has an economic presence in the state, rather than the
legislation pushed by the business community,' 0 wihwould further limit state
assertion of nexus for income tax purposes by extending the physical-presence
test found in the sales and use tax area to income taxation.
I find nothing to dispute in Ryan's analysis;" after all, I also have railed
against the inequities, distortions, and complexity created by the current
system,'12 have advocated a nexus standard based on economic presence for
both income taxes and sales and use taxes, 13 have criticized the legislative
7. UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT (1957).
8. See MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITES, THE "SINGLE SALES
FACTOR" FORMULA FOR STATE CORPORATE TAXES: A BOON To ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR A
COSTLY GIVEAWAY? 15-19 (2005), http://www.cbpp.org/3-27-OlIsfp.pdf (last visited Jan. 26,
2010) (discussing UDITPA's approach and the double-weighted sales formula) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); id. at 2 1-59 (discussing the sales-only formula).
9. Ryan, supra note 1, at 315-20.
10. Id. at 320-26.
11. I would, however, place less emphasis on "throwback" because the same political
forces that favor placing greater weight on sales also militate against the enactment of
throwback. See Fox et al., supra note 2, at 154-55 (providing a substantive criticism of
throwback).
12. McLure, Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes, supra note 2.
13. Thus, I wrote in Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce:
Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269 (1997),
the following:
Taxable activity should imply nexus, unless it is de mininis.... [A] person that
has a physical presence in the state or that conducts activities in a state that are
factors in the formula the state uses to apportion income among the states
(commonly payroll, property, and sales) should be subject to the income tax
jurisdiction of that state, unless such activities in the state are de minirnis.
Id. at 395-96. See also generally Charles E. Mcbure, Jr., Implementing State Corporate
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proposal to substitute instead a test based on a physical presence (a forerunner
to the Business Activity Tax Simplification Act'14 (BATSA) that Ryan finds
defective),'15 have decried the shift toward sales-only apportionment,'16 have
argued that many of the problems that Ryan describes could be avoided if only
a state would adopt combination,'17 and have proposed a comprehensive and
sensible UDITPA.' 8
III. Unilateral, Multilateral, and Federal Action
In thinking of what can and should be done, I find it useful to distinguish
among reforms that a single state could introduce unilaterally, those that require
Income Taxes in the Digital Age, 53 NAT'L TAx J. 1287 (2000); Dan Bucks & Frank Katz,
Explanation of the Multistate Tax Commission's ProposedFactor Presence Nexus Standard, 25
STATE TAx NOTES 1037 (2002).
14. Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2009 (BATSA), H.R. 1083, 111Ith Cong.
15. Walter Hellerstein & Charles E. McLure, Jr., Congressional Intervention in State
Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 31 STATE TAX NOTES 721 (2004).
16. See McLure, Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes, supra note 2, at 849 ("State
corporation income taxes exhibit nuttiness .. . in a recent trend to use only sales to apportion
income among states . .. ."). See also generally Michael Mazerov, Federal "Business Activity
Tax" Bill: Half of a Two-Pronged Strategy to Gut State Corporate Income Taxes, 35 STATE
TAX NOTES 399 (2005).
17. If a state taxes each member of a corporate group as a separate entity, without regard
to its economic relations with its corporate affiliates, it opens its treasury to the sorts of abuse
that Ryan describes, including manipulation of transfer pricing and the use of out-of-state
holding companies and affiliated financial services providers that lack nexus in the state to
siphon off taxable income. If, on the other hand, the state considers the activities of the unitary
group to which the taxpayer belongs in deternining the amount of income it taxes, ignoring
transactions between members of the unitary group, such abuses cannot occur. See McLure,
Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes, supra note 2, at 853 (suggesting the adoption of unitary
combination, thereby avoiding "the need to assert Geoffr-ey nexus or to tax domestic
dividends"); see also William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State Corporate Tax Revenue Trends;
Causes and Possible Solutions, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 491 (2002) (discussing state corporate tax
revenue trends, the underlying causes of the decline in corporate tax revenues, and the
alternative means of slowing or ending the decline in corporate tax revenues); Fox et al., supra
note 2, at 146-48 (noting the benefits and faults of combined reporting); MICHAEL MAzEROV,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A MAJORITY OF STATES HAVE Now ADOPTED A KEY
CORPORATE TAX REFoRm-"COMBINED REPORTING" 6 (2009), http://www.cbpp.org/4-5-
07sfp.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 20 10) ("The primary goal of combined reporting is to create a
level playing field for all businesses[,] . .. ensur[ing] that large multistate corporations cannot
end up paying income tax at a lower effective tax rate than small businesses. .. .") (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). It also may be necessary to expand the definition of
entities subject to the "corporate" income tax or to combination to include certain types of pass-
through entities.
18. Charles E. McLure, A Comprehensive and Sensible UDITPA, 37 STATE TAX NOTES
929 (2005).
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multilateral action by the states, and those that require federal action because
the states do not act in concert or cannot overcome existing federal restraints on
their powers.' 9 By its very nature, unilateral action cannot eliminate differences
in state policies and the complexity and economic inefficiencies they create;
20
only multilateral or federal action can do that. But unilateral state action can
minimize some of the abuses and the accompanying inequities and revenue
losses attributable to opportunities for tax planning that are created by unsound
state policy choices. On the other hand, unilateral state action can also create or
accentuate opportunities for inequities and abuse, and it may contribute to lack
of uniformity, as in the common, albeit unilateral, shifts to placing greater
weight on sales.
A. Unilateral Action
Combination. Requiring combined reporting among unitary corporations
is an example of the first type of policy. By enacting such a requirement, a
single state acting unilaterally could protect itself from the abuses inherent in
separate company reporting. There would be no need for other states to enact
similar requirements. Although uniformity across states in the way a unitary
group is defined would be beneficial, it would not be required.2' It is
particularly important that the Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on
combination.2 There is no doubt that a state has the power to require
19. I follow this approach, for example, in McLure, Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes,
supra note 2.
20. This is somewhat of an overstatement. Competitive shifts in the weight placed on
sales in the apportionment formula could eventually produce a uniform formula in which weight
is accorded only to sales. This would reduce complexity, but not distortions, abuse, and
inequity.
2 1. The Supreme Court implicitly has accepted, as a constitutional matter, a certain degree
of nonuniformity in this area, by stating that "the unitary business concept ... is not, so to
speak, unitary: there are variations on the theme, and any number of them are logically
consistent with the underlying principles motivating the approach." Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 167 (1983). The states thus have some latitude to use
inconsistent definitions of a unitary business. There are, however, constitutional restraints on
these definitions, at least when they become overly expansive. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho
State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 327 (1982) (invalidating state tax based on interpretation of
UDITPA's definition of "business income" that exceeded constitutional limits); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S. 354, 372-73 (1982) (same).
22. The judicial history of mandatory combination and the unitary business principle are
inextricably intertwined. The unitary concept was applied initially in taxation of express
companies to justify the taxation of an apportioned part of the economic activities of an entire
single entity. Later it was used to justify the combination of the activities of related
corporations engaged in a unitary business. Combination can be required only if a unitary
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combination when there is a unitary relationship between members of a
corporate group. There is also no doubt that Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to ban combination-or to require it-if it chose to do So.
2 3
Nexus. States have considerably less latitude to act unilaterally--or even
multilaterally-when it comes to assertion of nexus, and the extent of that
latitude is uncertain. The lack of latitude is most vividly illustrated by the
physical presence test of nexus in the sales and use tax area first announced in
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department ofRevenu 2 and reaffirmed in Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota. 25 Congress could eliminate that test, and the Supreme
Court might even do so, by overruling Quill, if the states were to eliminate
enough of the differences in their sales and use taxes that the Court thought that
imposing a duty to collect use tax would no longer place an undue burden on
interstate commerce.2 But until then, Quill remains good law, limiting state
assertion of nexus for use tax purposes.
By comparison, as Ryan notes, the situation is considerably less clear in
the case of nexus for income taxes purposes .2 7 The only broad-based federal
business exists; mere common ownership is not enough. The Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of the unitary principle in the context of the apportionment of the income of a group
of affiliated corporations (albeit not in the context of combined reporting) in 1980, stating that
"the linchpin of apportionabiliy... is the unitary business principle." Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980). The Court subsequently applied the same
principle in the context of combined reporting in Container Corp. See Container Corp. of Am.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 166 (1983) ("At the very least, . .. a State [may] not tax a
purported 'unitary business' unless at least some part of it is conducted in the State."); Walter
Hellerstein, The Case for Formulary Apportionment, 12 INT'L TRANSFER PICING J. 103, 107
(2005) ("[T]he case for formulary apportionment of the income of a group of commonly
controlled corporations often goes hand in hand with the case for reporting the income of those
entities on a consolidated or combined basis."); HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5,
8.07[l] (providing an overview of the constitutional underpinnings of the unitary business
principle).
23. Regarding the plenary powers Congress has to regulate interstate commerce, see
Walter Hellerstein, The US Supreme Court's State Tax Jurisprudence: A Template for
Comparison, in COMPARATWvE FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 2, at 67, 69.
24. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758-60 (1967) (holding
that Illinois had no power to impose liability on out-of-state mail order firm to collect use taxes
imposed by state law).
25. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992) (recognizing that "a
corporation may have the 'minimum contacts' with a taxing State as required by the Due
Process Clause, and yet lack the 'substantial nexus' with that State as required by the Commerce
Clause").
26. On efforts to create this degree of uniformity, see HELLERsTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 5, ch. 19A. On the politics of the matter, see John A. Swain & Walter Hellerstein, The
Political Economy of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, 58 NAT'L TAX J. 605
(2005).
27. See Ryan, supra note 1, at 301-07.
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legislation in this area, Public Law 86-2722' applies exclusively to those who
make only sales of tangible property, leaving those who derive income from
selling services or from owning or licensing intangible property subject to the
much less precise and restrictive nexus restraints derived from the Commerce
and Due Process Clauses .29 There continues to be litigation in state courts over
whether the bright-line physical presence test for assertion of nexus in the sales
and use tax area also applies to nexus for income taxation, although the
overwhelming body of case law has answered that question in the negative.3
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has left the issue in judicial limbo, by
refusing to grant certiorari in key cases, most notably in Geoffi-ey, Inc. v. South
Carolina Department of Revenue and Taxation and its progeny.31 Enough time
has passed since the Geoffi-ey and similar decisions that it seems reasonable to
believe that the Court will not soon (if ever) address the perplexing question of
whether an economic presence creates nexus for income tax purposes. But the
possibility that the Court will decide that it does not-and the implied need to
make massive refunds-means that in this area states that employ a test of
nexus based on economic presence live under a Damocles sword.
Division of Income. In its decision in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v.
Bair, 32 the Court made it clear that, absent congressional limitation, states have
28. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-391 (2006)).
29. Id. § 101(a)(1), 73 Stat. at 555.
30. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, 6.11 [3] (discussing post-Geoffrey
developments).
31. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 899 N.E.2d 87, 92-93 (Mass. 2009)
(concluding that the imposition of the taxing state's corporate excise tax did not violate the
Commerce Clause because, even though the corporation had no physical presence in the taxing
state, the corporation's licensing agreements with companies in the taxing state constituted a
substantial nexus with the taxing state), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2853 (2009); Capital One Bank
v. Conmm'r of Revenue, 899 N.E.2d 76, 8 1-82 (Mass. 2009) (concluding that the imposition of
financial institution excises on an out-of-state financial institution did not violate the Commerce
Clause because, even though the institution had no physical presence in the taxing state,
substantial nexus existed between the taxing state and the institution's activities with the state),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2827 (2009); Tax Commn'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226,
235-36 (W. Va. 2006) (finding that a foreign credit card company, with its principal place of
business and commercial domicile in Delaware, had a substantial economic presence in West
Virginia, thereby establishing a "substantial nexus"), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007); Lanco,
Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176, 176 (N.J. 2006) (sustaining the imposition of
corporate income tax liability on a foreign corporation having no physical presence in the state
"but deriv[ing] income through a licensing agreement company conducting retail operations" in
the state), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1131 (2007); Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d
13, 19 (S.C. 1993) (sustaining a state tax on plaintiffs royalty income and finding the state tax
not violate of the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution), cert. denied, 5 10 U.S. 992 (1993).
32. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 271-72, 276 (1978) (holding that Iowa's
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considerable latitude in choosing the apportionment formula to be used to
divide the business income of a multistate corporation .3 ' Because of desires to
avoid burdening the origin-based productive factors of labor and capital, there
has been a "race to the bottom" in shifting from the once-prevalent equally
weighted three-factor formula of UDITPA to formulas that place greater or sole
weight on sales, 34 which in the case of sales of tangible property are determined
on a destination basis. In the first instance, this shift shattered the uniformity
that prevailed before Moorman and made more lucrative the tax planning made
possible by Public Law 86-272. One can conceive of a day when uniformity is
restored-when all the states have adopted sales-only apportionment, although
this would restore uniformity only if, contrary to current practice, the states also
agreed to a uniform attribution rule for assigning receipts from services and
intangibles. Moreover, in the absence of a nexus test based on economic
presence, even a uniform sales-only apportionment rule would not restore
equity, as it would further enhance the profitability of tax planning.
Summary. States have considerable latitude both to employ combination
and to choose their own apportionment formulas. They have, however, until
recently been somewhat loathe to require combination, which would allow
them to minimize the risk of abuse inherent in separate corporate accounting. 35
By comparison, they have been eager to modify apportionment formulas, but in
ways that aggravate abuse, as well as lose revenue. Finally, their power to
assert nexus over out-of-state taxpayers is uncertain, but limited by federal law.
B. Multilateral Action
Because states have the power to act unilaterally to require combination
and to choose apportionment formulas, they clearly have the power to act in
single-factor sales formula, used to apportion income of interstate business for income tax
purposes, violated neither the Due Process Clause nor the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution).
33. Id. at 274. T1he Court stated the following:
[T]he States have wide latitude in the selection of apportionment formulas and that
a formula-produced assessment will only be disturbed when the taxpayer has
proved by clear and cogent evidence that the income attributed to the State is in fact
out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted in that State or has led
to a grossly distorted result.
Id. (citations and quotations omnitted).
34. Mazerov, supra, note 8, at 59.
35. It must be noted, however, that in the past few years several states (some for purposes
of gross receipts taxes) have required combined reporting. See Mazerov, supra note 17, at 2
(providing a state-by-state map of the current status of combined reporting).
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concert36 to adopt a uniform definition of what constitutes a unitary business or
a single formula for apportioning income, as long as they stay within the
guidelines of the Supreme Court's delineation of the unitary business principle
and fair apportionment, which should not be difficult.37 But there has been
little movement in this direction, and, indeed, as noted, there is much less
uniformity of apportionent formulas than before Moorman. State latitude to
adopt uniform nexus standards for income tax purposes, although seemingly
not constrained by the physical-presence test of Quill, is substantially less
because they are constrained by Public Law 86-272 with regard to income from
sales of tangible personal property. The constitutional restraints on nexus
outside the scope of Public Law 86-272 remain uncertain. The failure (or legal
inability) of the states to take action to reduce uniformity results in the
distortions, the opportunities for tax planning, and the complexities that Ryan
describes.
C. Federal Action
Congress could, in theory, require the states to apply a uniform definition
of a unitary business, a uniform apportionment formula, and a nexus standard
based on economic presence, thereby eliminating the distortions, opportunities
for tax planning, inequities, and complexities that concern Ryan. It seems,
however, for reasons to be described in the final section, that this is not likely to
happen.
IV The Willis Committee Report
Before I turn to the prospects for achieving uniformity, through either
multilateral state action or federal legislation, it will be convenient to review
some history that began a half-century ago but still casts a long shadow. It was,
perhaps, our last best hope for uniformity.
36. The Supreme Court ruled in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission,
434 U.S. 452 (1978), that states were free to enter into compacts that do not enlarge the powers
granted to the states under the Constitution at the expense of federal powers. U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978) ("[Tlhe application of the Compact Clause is
limited to agreements that are directed to the formation of any combination tending to the
increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States." (quotations omitted)).
37. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 5, ch. 8 (describing the unitary business
principle and the fair apportionment criterion and indicating that the relevant constitutional
standards are quite forgiving).
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In 1959, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that suggested that
there might be little effective limit on state assertion of nexus in the corporate
income tax area .3 In response, Congress quickly enacted Public Law 86-272,
which was intended to be only a temporary fix pending enactment of permanent
legislation, and called for a thorough investigation of state taxes. The result,
the Willis Report, was the most comprehensive analysis ever of the state
corporate income tax. The Willis Committee made proposals for both
substantive and administrative reforms that, if they had been enacted, would
have essentially eliminated diversity in state corporate income taxes, except
with regard to rates. These proposals were broadly consistent in many respects
with what I have proposed here and elsewhere, the notable difference being the
nexus standard.
Substantive Proposals. Both jurisdiction to tax and apportionment would
be based on payroll and property (real property, in the case of nexus), and
consolidation would be mandatory, based on common ownership.3
This system, despite any defects, would have been superior to what exists
now. Most fundamentally, uniformity would prevail; the distortions and
complexity that result from nontuniformity would not exist. Consolidation
would eliminate opportunities for tax planning involving transfer pricing,
Delaware holding companies, and financial services institutions headquartered
in other states. The nexus standard of Public Law 86-272 would not exist, and
issues related to throwback and the weight placed on sales in the apportionment
formula-particularly the shift to sales-only apportionment-would not arise.
It is true that states could not assert nexus based on economic presence (as
indicated by sales or intangible assets), but this would not result in nowhere
income. Also, sales would not appear in the apportionment formula, but the
Willis Committee concluded that the effects of omitting sales from the
apportionment formula were not quantitatively significant.4
Administrative Proposals. The Willis Committee recommended giving the
Treasury Department authority to issue uniform rules and regulations governing
state corporation income taxes, to create a uniform state tax return, to prescribe
38. Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959) ("[iNlet
income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation
provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the
taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the same.").
39. See H.R. REP. No. 89-952, at 1143-61 (1965) (recommending the definition of income
to follow the federal definition, thereby eliminating the undesirable distinction between business
and nonbusiness income).
40. Id at 529-55.
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use of a modified apportionment formula or separate accounting by particular
taxpayers, and to resolve multistate conflicts.'
Most states objected to the loss of tax sovereignty inherent in the
recommendations of the Willis Committee. Moreover, particular states feared
loss of revenue if the proposals were enacted. Market states objected to
elimination of the sales factor, and states of commercial domicile of
corporations, which tax nonbusiness income, worried about the loss of revenue
implicit in full apportionment. In addition, business objected to mandatory
consolidation. State fear that the Willis Committee's proposals might be
enacted helped to precipitate adoption of UDITPA by some states, the drafing
of the Multistate Tax Compact, and the creation of the Multistate Tax
Commission (MTC). Once the threat of federal legislation had subsided, the
states went back, for the most part, to unilateral action-a course that received
an enormous boost by the 1978 decision in Moorman.
V The Politics of Uniformnity
Recent history also suggests that uniformity-at least not uniformity that
would increase equity, as well as reduce complexity and distortions-will not
come about soon, whether through multilateral state action or federal action.
A. Multilateral Action
In August 2007, at the behest of the MTC,4 the Uniform Law
Commission convened a drafting committee to revise UDITPA.4 This effort
was abandoned quickly when organizations representing state legislators made
41. Id. at 1135-36, 1161-63.
42. See Letter from Joan Wagnon, Chair, Multistate Tax Comm'n, and Joe Huddleston,
Executive Dir., Multistate Tax Comm'n, to Robert A. Stein, Esq., Chair, Comm. on Scope and
Program, Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws (Sept. 6,2006) ("We believe model
amendments or a complete rewrite are critical to preserving the original uniformity goals of
UITA. .. .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Memorandum from Joe
Huddleston, Executive Dir., Multistate Tax Comni'n, to Charles A. Trost, Chair, Study Comm.
on Revisions of UDITPA 1 (May 2, 2007) ("In the interest of preserving the broadest uniformity
possible, we invite NCCUSL to work with us to review and draft model proposed amendments
to UDITPA . . . .") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. See Press Release, Unif. Law Commn'n, National Law Group Revising Important State
Tax Law (Feb. 13, 2008), available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/Docs/UDITPA/JDITPA_
PressRelease_-021308.pdf (announcing formation of the drafting committee to reexamine
UDITPA).
337
338 7 WASH. & LEE L. REV 32 7 (2010)
it clear that it was not welcome and that any revision of the model statute would
be widely rejected by the states."4
This outcome was hardly unexpected.4 Corporations generally have a
vested interest in nonuniformity, as it allows them to play one state against
another in gaining generous tax treatment. Nor are the states necessarily
interested in uniformity, which they reject so they will be able to cater to
business, in order to attract investment-or simply to retain sovereignty for its
own sake.4
B. FederalAction
The political dynamics are a bit different in the case of federal legislation
that would increase uniformity. Business would like to see additional restraints
on state assertion of nexus and would bitterly oppose federal legislation
legalizing a test of nexus based on economic presence. It presumably would
not want a return to the days of uniform apportionment formulas, unless the
formula adopted was weighted heavily toward sales. It also would oppose a
requirement for mandatory combination. (Uniformity of definitions of the
unitary group would probably matter much less.)
State positions on nexus rules and perhaps combination generally would
be diametrically opposed to those of business. But states also likely would
resist federal limits on their ability to choose apportionment formulas. This
opposition goes beyond a desire to engage in beggar-thy-neighbor policies by
altering the apportionment formula. It reflects widespread resistance to federal
encroachment on state fiscal sovereignty. This resistance helps explain the
defeat of what, in retrospect, may have been the best hope for rationalizing state
corporate income taxes, the 1965 proposals of the Willis Committee.
44. See John Buhl, ULC Committee Recommends Halting UDITRA Revision Study, 53
STATE TAx NoTES 7, 7 (2009) (noting the Uniform Law Commission's recommendation to
terminate a study of whether to revise UDITPA); Joe Huddleston & Shirley Sicilian, The Project
to Revise UDITPA 9 (2009), http://www.mtc.gov/Uniformity.aspx?id=4562 (follow "The
Project to Revise UDITPA" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (noting the strong opposition
to the project from, among others, the Committee on State Taxation, ALEC, and the Tax
Executives Institute) (on tile with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. Indeed, I had predicted it in Charles E. McLure, Jr., Understanding Uniformity and
Diversity in State Corporate Income Taxes, 61 NAT'L TAX J. 141 (2008).
46. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting ALEC's preference for state
sovereignty).
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C. Political Stalemate?
Business appears to be engaged in a two-part strategy to undermine the
state corporate income tax, pushing for a physical presence test of nexus, and
for sales-only apportionment in state capitals. States seem only too happy to
increase the weight on sales, but not to accept a tighter constraint on nexus.
Which side will prevail in Washington remains to be seen.
The only important multilateral state actions in this area, the drafting of
UDITPA, the adoption of the Multistate Tax Compact, which incorporated
UDITPA, and the creation of the MTC, were precipitated by the specter of
federal legislation proposed by the Willis Committee and lay well within the
states' constitutional competence.4 This experience has little salience in the
current debate over nexus rules. The threat that BATSA may become law is
not likely to fire up the states to enact a uniform test based on economic
presence. The issue is not merely that the states cannot agree to act in accord.
Rather, in the absence of definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, there is
considerable uncertainty as to what is allowable under the Constitution.
47. See W. Bartley Hildreth et al., Interstate Tax Uniformity and the Multistate Tax
Commission, 58 NAT'L TAx J. 575 passim (2005) (discussing the progress of state corporate
income tax uniformity); Bartley Hildreth et al., Cooperation or Competition: The Multistate
Tax Commission and State Corporate Tax Uniformnity, 38 STATE TAxNoTEs 827 passim (2005)
(tracing the history of the MTC and discussing the progress of state corporate income tax
uniformity).
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